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Abstract 
The Long Term Evolution of UMTS is one of the latest steps in 
an advancing series of mobile telecommunications systems. 
Many articles have already been published on the LTE subject 
but these publications have viewed the subject from particular 
perspectives. In the present paper, a different approach has been 
taken. We are interested in the security features and the 
cryptographic algorithms used to ensure confidentiality and 
integrity of the transmitted data. A closer look is taken to the two 
EPS confidentiality and integrity algorithms based on the block 
cipher algorithm AES: the confidentiality algorithm EEA2 and 
the integrity algorithm EIA2. Furthermore, we focused on the 
implementation of both algorithms in C language in respect to 
the specifications requirements. We have tested our 
implementations according to the testsets given by the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) implementation 
document. Some examples of the implementation tests are 
presented bellow. 
Keywords: LTE, Confidentiality, Integrity, AES, EEA, EIA, 
Implementation 
1. EPS Security Mechanisms 
EPS (Evolved Packet System) represents the very latest 
evolution of the UMTS standard. EPS is also known by 
other acronyms related to technical study items being 
worked on at 3GPP committees: LTE (Long Term 
Evolution), which is dedicated to the evolution of the radio 
interface, and SAE (Service Architecture Evolution) which 
focuses on Core Network architecture evolution. 
 
EPS is specified as part of the 3GPP family and proposes a 
significant improvement step, with a new radio interface 
and an evolved architecture for both the Access and the 
Core Network parts. 
 
Security is another important feature of the 3GPP family 
and its evolution is an important issue. EPS provides 
security features in a similar way as its predecessors 
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) 
and GSM (Global System Mobile). In addition to the 
mutual authentication functionality of the network and the 
user, two other security functions are provided to ensure 
data security during its transmission over the air interface 
and through the LTE-SAE system: ciphering of both user 
plane data and control plane data (in the RRC (Radio 
Resource Control) layer), and integrity protection which is 
used for control plane data only. For the NAS (Non-
Access Stratum) network, both ciphering and integrity are 
provided. 
 
Ciphering is used in order to protect the data streams from 
being received by a third party, while integrity protection 
allows the receiver to detect packet insertion or 
replacement. 
 
In the present paper, we will focus on the study of EPS 
confidentiality and integrity mechanisms and on the 
cryptographic algorithms used to fulfill these security 
features. 
 1.1 LTE Confidentiality and Integrity Layer 
User and signaling data are considered sensitive and their 
confidentiality and integrity should be protected between 
the UE (User Equipment) and the serving network. For 
this reason and in contrast with UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System) where the data confidentiality 
and integrity had been ensured only in the air interface 
(between UE and RNC (Radio Network Controller)), these 
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features in the EPS have been implemented in different 
levels to ensure more data security. 
1.1.1 Overview of LTE control and user plane 
protocol stacks 
Confidentiality and Integrity protection for RRC (Radio 
Resource Control) and UP (User Plane) data is provided 
between the UE and the e-NB (Evolved Node-B) in the 
Access Stratum (AS). These security features are applied 
at the PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) layer, 
and no layers below PDCP are confidentiality protected. 
For the NAS signaling protection, the security controls are 
done between UEs and MMEs (Mobility Management 
Entity) by the NAS protocol [1, 2]. 
 
The PDCP layer is the upper sub-layer of Layer 2 in the 
LTE Protocol stack. Fig.1 bellow shows the user plane 
protocol stack in the Enhanced UMTS Terrestrial Radio 
Access Network (E-UTRAN) named also LTE. 
 
Fig. 1 LTE User plane protocol stack [3] 
On the other hand, Fig. 2 bellow shows the emplacement 
of the RRC and NAS signaling in the EPS control plane. 
 
Fig. 2 EPS Control plane protocol stack [3] 
After presenting control and user plane stack, we will 
present in the following subsection an overview of the 
implementation of integrity and confidentiality features in 
the PDCP layer. 
 
1.1.2 PDCP security functions 
The PDCP layer manages data streams for the user plane, 
as well as for the control plane. The architecture of the 
PDCP layer differs for user plane data and control plane 
data, as shown in the figures Fig. 3 and Fig. 4   
respectively. 
 
Fig. 3 Overview of user-plane PDCP [1, 4] 
The ciphering function performed by the PDCP layer 
includes both ciphering and deciphering. For the user 
plane, the data unit that is ciphered is the data part of the 
PDCP PDU, as shown in the figure Fig. 3 above. 
 
For the control plane, the data unit that is ciphered is the 
data part of the PDCP PDU and MAC-I. Indeed, PDCP 
Data PDUs for control plane data comprise a MAC-I field 
of 32-bit length for integrity protection as presented in Fig. 
4 bellow. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Overview of control-plane PDCP [1, 4] 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 7, Issue 4, No 4, July 2010 
www.IJCSI.org 
 
17
 
Moreover, it is important to mention that the NAS, 
independently, applies integrity protection and ciphering 
in the NAS layer. 
 
The ciphering and integrity algorithms and keys to be used 
by the PDCP entity are configured by upper layers. 
1.2 Confidentiality and Integrity mechanisms 
1.2.1 User and signaling data Confidentiality 
To ensure the data confidentiality, the following 
procedures are provided [5]: 
 
 Cipher algorithm EEA (EPS Encryption Algorithm) 
agreement: To ensure the confidentiality of user and 
signaling data in LTE-SAE (Long Term Evolution - 
Service Architecture Evolution), 3GPP has maintained 
the use of the UMTS algorithm UEA2 based on 
SNOW 3G algorithm [1, 6], and has named it EEA1. 
In addition, a new algorithm EEA2, based on AES 
algorithm used in the CTR mode (Counter Mode), has 
been adopted. We will be interested in its operation 
study in detail in section 2. of the present paper. 
Besides, the UE and the EPS can securely negotiate the 
algorithm to use in their mutual communication. 
 
 Cipher key agreement: the agreement is done between 
the UE and the network during the                 
Authentication and Key Agreement procedure; 
 
 Encryption/Decryption of user and signaling data; 
1.2.2 Signaling data Integrity 
Data integrity in the EPS network ensures the protection             
of the signaling data integrity and allows the 
authentication of the signaling messages transmitted 
between the user and             the serving network [5, 7]. 
User data is not integrity protected. 
 
Integrity protection, and replay protection, shall be 
provided to all NAS and RRC-signaling messages except 
those explicitly listed in 3GPP documents [1]. 
 
The following security features are provided to ensure             
the signaling data integrity on the LTE and SAE: 
 
 Integrity algorithm (EIA) agreement: as for the data 
confidentiality, there are actually two variants of the 
integrity algorithm for LTE: EIA1 based on SNOW 3G 
algorithm (named UIA2 in UMTS network) [1, 6]. It 
was used since 2006 in the UMTS network and was 
maintained in the LTE-SAE network                 and the 
second algorithm EIA2, based on AES algorithm, 
which will be studied in detail in section 3 of the 
present paper. 
 
 Integrity key (IK) agreement; 
 Data integrity feature: the receiving entity (ME or SN) 
must be able to check that the signaling data wasn't                 
modified during its transition over the network                 
access link and to check the expected origin of the 
message (SN (Serving Network) or UE). 
 
1.3 EPS Algorithms Identification 
As seen in the subsection 1.2.2 bellow, there are nowadays 
two sets of security algorithms used in the Long Term 
Evolution network. The first set is based on the stream 
cipher algorithm SNOW 3G, which is inherited for UMTS, 
the 3rd generation of mobile telecommunication. The 
second set is based on the well-known block cipher 
algorithm AES. Each algorithm is identified by an 
identifier. The following subsections present the EEA and 
the EIA algorithms identification used by 3GPP 
specifications documents [1]. 
 
1.3.1 EEA Algorithm Identification 
The EPS Encryption Algorithms (EEA) are algorithms 
work with internal 128-bit blocks under the control of a 
128-bit input key except Null ciphering algorithm. 
 
To each EEA algorithm is assigned a 4-bit identifier. 
Currently, the following values have been defined for 
NAS, RRC and UP ciphering: 
 
  “00002”:  EEA0   Null ciphering algorithm. The EEA0 
algorithm is implemented in the way that it has the 
same effect as if it generates a keystream of all zeroes. 
The length of the generated keystream has to be equal 
to the LENGTH input parameter. Apart from this, all 
processing performed in association with ciphering are 
exactly the same as with any of the ciphering 
algorithms [2].  
 
 “00012”: 128-EEA1. The EEA1 is a stream cipher 
based on another stream cipher named SNOW 3G [6, 8, 
9, 10]. As mentioned before, EEA1 is an inheritance 
from UTMS and was introduced as 3GPP standard on 
2006. 
 
 “00102”: 128-EEA2. The EEA2 is a stream cipher 
based on the block cipher AES algorithm used in its 
CTR (CounTeR mode) mode. 
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UEs and eNBs shall implement EEA0, 128-EEA1 and 
128-EEA2 for both RRC signaling ciphering and UP 
ciphering. 
 
Besides, UEs and MMEs shall implement EEA0, 128-
EEA1 and 128-EEA2 for NAS signaling ciphering. 
 
It is important to note that the security functions are never 
deactivated, although it is possible to apply a NULL 
ciphering algorithm; The NULL algorithm may be used in 
certain special cases, such as for making an emergency 
call without a USIM. 
 
1.3.2 EIA Algorithm Identification 
Like EPS Confidentiality algorithms, all EPS Integrity 
Algorithms (EIA) works under control of a 128-bit input 
key, and for each one a 4-bit identifier is assigned. 
Currently, the following values have been defined [2]: 
 
 "00002": EIA0 Null Integrity Protection algorithm. The 
EIA0 use is only allowed for unauthenticated 
emergency calls. 
 
 "00012": 128-EIA1. The EIA1 is based on the stream 
cipher SNOW 3G [6, 8, 9, 10].  
 
 "00102": 128-EIA2. The EIA2 is based on the block 
cipher AES used in its CMAC (Cipher-based MAC) 
mode. 
 
The remaining values have been reserved for future use. 
 
UEs and eNBs shall implement 128-EIA1 and 128-EIA2 
for RRC signaling integrity protection. Both algorithms 
shall be implemented also by UEs and MMEs for NAS 
signaling integrity protection [2]. 
 
In the present paper, we are interested in studying the two 
algorithms EEA2 and EIA2 based on AES. Regarding the 
first set of cryptographic algorithms inherited from UMTS, 
their study has been subject of previous works [9, 10]. 
2. LTE Confidentiality algorithm EEA2 
2.1 Encryption function EEA 
The needs for a confidentiality protected mode of 
transmission are fulfilled by an LTE confidentiality 
cryptographic algorithm EEA [2, 5] which is a symmetric 
synchronous stream cipher. This type of ciphering has the 
advantage to generate the mask of data before even 
receiving the data to encrypt, which help to save time. 
Furthermore, it is based on bitwise operations which are 
carried out quickly. 
 
Fig. 5 bellow illustrates the Encryption/Decryption 
operations using the algorithm EEA. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Encryption/Decryption of user and signaling data 
The input parameters of EEA are the same as for the 
UMTS encryption function f8. They are as follow: 
 
 COUNT-C: Frame dependent input used to 
synchronize the sender and the receiver; 
 
 BEARER : Service bearer identity;  
 
 DIRECTION : Direction of the transmission; 
 
 LENGTH : Number of bits to be encrypted /decrypted; 
 
 Key: The cipher key. Unlike the UMTS where the 
encryption entities use only one cipher key for either 
user data or signaling data, in the EPS (LTE-SAE), 
different cipher keys are used depending on the data to 
protect: 
 
- KUPenc: an 128-bit cipher key for User Plane 
confidentiality; 
 
- KRRCenc: a 128-bit cipher key for RRC signaling 
data confidentiality, provided by the PDCP layer 
between UE and eNB (in the LTE network). 
 
- KNASenc: a 128-bit cipher Key for NAS (Non-
Access Stratum) signaling confidentiality, provided 
as part of the NAS protocol between UE and MME 
(in the SAE part). 
 
Fig. 6 bellow shows the correspondence between security 
keys and information flows in the network [3]. 
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Fig. 6 Correspondence between security keys and information flows in 
the network [3] 
For LTE, as seen above, two encryption algorithms EEA1 
and EEA2 where adopted. The second variant EEA2 is 
based on the AES algorithm used in the CTR operation 
Mode (CTR Mode). 
 
In the subsection bellow, we will be interested in studying 
the EEA2 operation and implementation. 
 
2.2 Encryption Algorithm EEA2 Operation 
The second EPS confidentiality algorithm EEA2 uses the 
block cipher AES as a kernel. The arguments for the 
choice of AES as a core algorithm for the second LTE 
Confidentiality algorithm (compared to UEA1 in the 
UMTS which uses the cipher block KASUMI) are given 
bellow. But apart from these, UEA1 based on KASUMI 
and EEA2 based on AES were perceived as equally good 
choices [1]: 
 
 The eNB needs to support AES in any case because the 
eNB needs to support NDS/IP (Network Domain 
Security/Internet Protocol), which uses AES. 
 
 The licensing conditions on the core of UEA1/UIA1 
(Kasumi) do not make it free for use for other purposes 
than 3GPP access protection. 
 
 Similarity with other non-3GPP accesses. 
 
In this section, we will focus on the study of the EEA2 
structure and operation to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
Indeed, 128-EEA2 is based on 128-bit AES [11] in CTR 
mode [12]. AES-CTR has many properties that make it an 
attractive encryption algorithm for high-speed networking. 
AES-CRT uses the AES block cipher to create a stream 
cipher. Data is encrypted and decrypted by using an 
exclusive-OR operation between intput data (the plaintext) 
and the keystream produced by encrypting sequential 
counter block values by the AES algorithm. 
 
2.2.1 Initialization and keystream generation 
The sequence of 128-bit counter blocks needed for CTR 
mode T1, T2, …, Ti, … is constructed as follows: 
 
The most significant 64 bits of T1 consist of COUNT[0] .. 
COUNT[31] || BEARER[0] .. BEARER[4] || DIRECTION 
|| 026 (i.e. 26 zero bits). These input values are written from 
most significant bit on the left to least significant bit on the 
right, so for example COUNT[0] is the most significant bit 
of T1. The least significant 64 bits of T1 are all 0. Fig. 7 
bellow shows the counter construction from the EEA2 
input data. 
 
 
Fig. 7 First Counter block T1 
Subsequent counter blocks are then obtained by applying 
the standard integer incrementing function (according to 
Appendix B1 in [12]) mod 264 to the least significant 64 
bits of the previous counter block [2]. 
 
2.2.2 Encryption/Decryption 
To encrypt a payload with AES-CTR, the encryptor 
partitions the plaintext, PT, into 128-bit blocks. The final 
block needs not to be 128 bits; it can be less. 
 
PT = PT[1] PT[2] ... PT[n] 
 
Each PT block is XORed with a block of the keystream to 
generate the ciphertext, CT.  The AES encryption of each 
counter block results in 128 bits of keystream. The most 
significant 64 bits of the counter block T are initialized as 
seen before, followed by 64 bits that are all 0. This least 
significant 64 bits part of the counter T is the value that is                    
incremented by one mod 264 to generate subsequent 
counter blocks, each resulting in another 128 bits of 
keystream.  The encryption of n plaintext blocks can be 
summarized as: 
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T := COUNT || BEARER || DIRECTION || 026 ||   T0       
(T0 indicate 64 bits all equal 0. It presents the part of the 
Counter block T that will be incremented mod 264). 
 
FOR i := 1 to n-1 DO 
 
CT[i] := PT[i] XOR AES(T) 
 
T0 := T0 + 1 
 
END 
 
CT[n] := PT[n] XOR TRUNC(AES(T)) 
 
The AES() function performs AES encryption under the 
control of the confidentiality key. 
 
The TRUNC() function truncates the last output of the 
AES encrypt operation to the same length as the final 
plaintext block, returning the most significant bits.  
 
Fig. 8 bellow illustrates the EEA encryption/decryption 
mechanism. 
 
 
Fig. 8 EEA2 structure 
The decryption operation is similar to the encryption and it 
is important to note that the AES-CTR uses the only AES 
encrypt operation (for both encryption and decryption),                     
making AES-CTR implementation smaller than 
implementations of many other AES modes. 
2.3 EEA2 Implementation 
Unlike the first EPS algorithm EEA1 where the codes 
where given by the 3GPP specification, we have coded the 
EEA2 algorithm in C language with respect to endianess 
issues to avoid the memory reading problems faced with 
EEA1. 
 
We have tested our implementation by performing all the 
TestSets given by 3GPP in the specification document [2], 
the results correspond to 3GPP expected results. We give 
you bellow one TestSet with the obtained result. 
 
Input Data: 
 
Key = 0a8b6bd8 d9b08b08 d64e32d1 817777fb 
Count = 544d49cd    Bearer = 04 
Direction = 0   Length     = 310 bits 
 
Plaintext = 
fd40a41d 370a1f65 74509568 7d47ba1d 36d2349e 
23f64439 2c8ea9c4 9d40c132 71aff264 d0f24800 
 
Expected Ciphertext = 
75750d37 b4bba2a4 dedb3423 5bd68c66 45acdaac 
a48138a3 b0c471e2 a7041a57 6423d292 7287f000 
 
Fig. 9 bellow shows the Test result which meets the 3GPP 
Test implementation data. 
 
 
Fig. 9 EEA2 TestSet 
3. LTE Integrity algorithm EIA2 
3.1 Integrity function EIA 
Integrity protection is realized by adding a field known as 
“Message Authentication Code for Integrity” (MAC-I) to 
each RRC or NAS message whose integrity has to be 
protected. This field is calculated by one of the EPS 
Integrity algorithms defined globally by the integrity 
function EIA. The input parameters to the integrity 
algorithm are the following: 
 
 a 32-bit COUNT; 
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 a 5-bit bearer identity called BEARER; 
 
 the 1-bit direction of the transmission i.e. DIRECTION. 
The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for uplink and 1 for 
downlink; 
 
 the message itself i.e. MESSAGE. The bit length of the 
MESSAGE is LENGTH; 
 
 a 128-bit integrity key. As for the encryption key, in 
the EPS (LTE-SAE) system, different integrity keys 
are used, depending on the level where it is used. Fig. 
6 presented in subsection 2.1 shows the different levels 
and keys used in each one. 
 
- KRRCint: a 128-bit Integrity Key for the protection of 
the RRC signaling data integrity, provided by the 
PDCP layer between UE and eNB (in the LTE 
network). 
 
- KNASint: a 128-bit Integrity Key for NAS (Non-
Access Stratum) signaling integrity, provided as 
part of the NAS protocol between UE and MME 
(SAE network); 
 
Fig. 10 illustrates the use of the integrity algorithm EIA to 
protect the messages integrity. 
 
 
Fig. 10 Derivation of MAC-I/NAS-MAC (or XMAC-I/XNAS-MAC) 
Based on these input parameters the sender computes a 
32-bit message authentication code (MAC-I/NAS-MAC) 
using the integrity algorithm EIA. The message 
authentication code is then appended to the message when 
sent. The receiver computes the expected message 
authentication code (XMAC-I/XNAS-MAC) for the 
received message in the same way as the sender computed 
its message authentication code for the sent message and 
verifies the data integrity of the message by comparing it 
to the received message authentication code, i.e. MAC-
I/NAS-MAC. 
 
In the subsections bellow, we will be interested in the 
study of the EIA2 operation and then its implementation. 
 
3.2 Integrity Algorithm EIA2 Operation 
In this section, we will focus on the study of the EIA2 
structure and operation to generate the MAC-I (Message 
Authentication Code for Integrity). Indeed, EIA2 is based 
on 128-bit AES [11] in the CMAC (cipher-based MAC) 
mode for Authentication [13]. CMAC, like any well-
designed MAC algorithm, provides stronger assurance of 
data integrity than a checksum or an error detecting code. 
The verification of a checksum or an error detecting code 
is designed to detect only accidental modifications of the 
data, while CMAC is designed to detect intentional, 
unauthorized modifications of the data, as well as 
accidental modifications [13]. 
 
In the following subsections, we will present the different 
EIA2 operation steps. 
 
3.2.1 Subkey Generation 
Before proceeding to the MAC calculation, the EIA2 
algorithm uses a subkey generation function to generate 
two subkeys needed during the MAC generation process. 
 
Indeed, the integrity key K is used to derive two additional 
secret values, called the subkeys, denoted K1 and K2. The 
length of each subkey is 128 bits. The two subkeys are 
fixed once for any invocation of CMAC with the given 
key. So, for our implementation, the subkeys are 
precomputed and stored with the key for repeated use [13]. 
 
One of the elements of the subkey generation process is a 
bit string R which depends on the used block cipher AES 
size, which is in our case 128. So, 
R128 = 012010000111 
 
We present bellow, the specification of the subkey 
generation process of CMAC [13]: 
 
L = AESK(0128) 
(128 is the block size of the block cipher AES used in 
EIA2) 
 
IF MSB1 (L) = 0 
THEN K1 = L << 1; 
                     
ELSE 
K1 = (L << 1)   R128; 
 
IF MSB1 (K1) = 0 
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THEN K2 = K1 << 1; 
 
ELSE 
K2 = (K1 << 1)  R128 
 
Return K1, K2. 
 
3.2.2 Algorithm Initialization 
As we have seen before, 128-EIA2 is based on 128-bit 
AES in CMAC mode. Before proceeding to the MAC-I 
calculation, the input parameters of the CMAC mode are 
constructed as follow: 
 
The bit length of MESSAGE is LENGTH. The input to 
CMAC mode is a bit string M of length Mlen where Mlen 
= LENGTH + 64. M is constructed as follows (M_Biti are 
the bits constituting M): 
 
M_Bit0 … M_Bit31 = COUNT[0] … COUNT[31] 
 
M_Bit32 … M_Bit36 = BEARER[0] … BEARER[4] 
 
M_Bit37 = DIRECTION 
 
M_Bit38 … M_Bit63 = 026 (i.e. 26 zero bits) 
             
M_Bit64 … M_BitLENGTH+63 = MESSAGE[0] …  
MESSAGE[LENGTH-1] 
 
3.2.3 MAC Generation 
AES in CMAC mode is used with the inputs presented 
above to produce a Message Authentication Code T of 
length Tlen = 32.  T is used directly as the 128-EIA2 
output MACT[0]  .. MACT[31], with MACT[0] is the 
most significant bit of T. 
 
In the following, we present the generation process of the 
Message Authentication Code T, using the block cipher 
AES in the CMAC mode. We have exposed, in the 
subsection above, the input parameters of the algorithm. 
The bit representation of these parameters is M_Bit0 … 
M_BitLENGTH+63. However, it is important to note that 
during the MAC generation process, we will work with 
blocks of 128 bits constructed from the M_Bit bits 
sequence. These blocks are named M, such that M = M1 || 
M2 || … || Mn-1 || M*n, where M1, M2, …, Mn-1 are complete 
blocks. These last remark is very usefully for 
understanding some steps of the MAC generation process, 
since some operations depends on the fact that the last 
block M*n is a complete (containing 128 bits) or not 
complete (less than 128 bits) block. 
 
Bellow is presented the MAC generation algorithm. 
 
IF Mlen = 0 
THEN n = 1; 
 
ELSE 
THEN n = Mlen/128 ; 
 
IF M*n is a complete block 
THEN Mn = K1  M*n; 
 
ELSE 
THEN { 
        j = n * 128 - Mlen - 1; 
       Mn = K2  (M*n || 10j); 
             } 
 
C0 = 0128; 
 
FOR i = 1 to n 
Ci = AESK (Ci-1  Mi); 
 
T = MSB32 (Cn) 
 
RETURN T. 
 
3.3 EIA2 Implementation 
Like EEA2, the EIA2 algorithm code wasn't given by the 
3GPP specification, so we have coded it in C language 
with respect to endianess issues to avoid the memory 
reading problems faced with EIA1. 
 
We have tested our implementation by performing all the 
TestSets given by 3GPP in the specification document [2], 
the results correspond to 3GPP expected results. You find 
bellow an example of the implementation of one of the 
testsets given by 3GPP. 
 
Input Data: 
 
Key = 6832a65c ff447362 1ebdd4ba 26a921fe 
Count = 36af6144  Bearer     = 18 
Direction = 0   Length     = 383 bits 
 
Message = 
d3c53839 62682071 77656676 20323837 63624098 
1ba6824c 1bfb1ab4 85472029 b71d808c e33e2cc3 
c0b5fc1f 3de8a6dc 
 
Fig. 11 bellow shows the Test result which meets the 
3GPP Test implementation data. 
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Fig. 11 EIA2 Implementation Example 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, a detailed study of the EPS security 
mechanisms was carried out. We gave an algorithmic 
approach to this security subject. The objective was to 
understand and present clearly the 3GPP tendency 
regarding the cryptographic algorithms used to ensure data 
transmission security over 3G and 4G telecommunication 
networks. To achieve this and after our previous work on 
the first 3GPP set of cryptographic algorithms, we were 
interested, in the present paper, in the different modes and 
operation steps of the second set of LTE confidentiality 
and integrity algorithms EEA2 and EIA2 based on the 
block cipher AES. 
 
We have presented the confidentiality algorithm EEA2 
and the integrity algorithm EIA2 and then we have 
focused on their implementation in respect to the 3GPP 
requirements. Using the 3GPP implementation tests 
document, we tested our implementation and some results 
were exposed. We can realize that the algorithms EEA2 
and EIA2 were well designed to be used for mobile 
telecommunication networks since the choice of their 
kernel algorithm (AES) and their operation modes ensures 
efficiency and rapidity, two criteria that are very crucial 
for such networks. 
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